

Towards Precision-Aware Safe Neural-Controlled Cyber-Physical Systems

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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are increasingly utilizing neural networks (NN) as controllers. Thus, ensuring the safety of these systems becomes crucial, specifically in the context of safety-critical application domains. Current safety verification focuses on reachability analysis, considering bounded errors from noisy environments or inaccurate implementations. However, it assumes real-valued arithmetic and does not account for the fixed-point quantization often used in embedded systems. Some recent efforts have focused on generating sound quantized NN implementations in fixed-point, ensuring specific target error bounds, but they assume the safety of NNs is already proven.

To bridge this gap, we introduce *Nexus*, a novel two-phase framework combining reachability analysis with sound NN quantization. *Nexus* provides an end-to-end solution that ensures CPS safety within bounded errors while generating mixed-precision fixed-point implementations for NN controllers. Additionally, we optimize these implementations for automated parallelization on FPGAs using a commercial HLS compiler, reducing machine cycles specifically for larger NN controllers.

I. INTRODUCTION

Modern cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are rapidly evolving to handle complex functionalities in highly dynamic, nonlinear, and uncertain environments. These closed-loop systems are involving neural networks (NNs) as controllers for their flexibility and adaptability. However, deploying NN-controlled systems in safety-critical applications like adaptive cruise control for cars or airplane collision avoidance systems [1] requires ensuring safety and being optimized for efficiency.

Recent efforts have focused on automatically verifying the safety of NN-controlled systems [2], [3], [4], [5]. These methods consider NN controllers trained in high-precision floating-point arithmetic on powerful machines with GPUs emulating exact real-valued arithmetic. These controllers sense system states at discrete intervals, compute control values, and adjust system dynamics based on ordinary differential equations. The aim of the verification is to estimate safe, reachable states of the system within a finite time, considering bounded errors from noisy environments or inaccurate implementations.

However, directly implementing high-precision floating-point NN controllers on embedded architectures with constrained resources is often impractical due to high computation costs or the lack of dedicated floating-point co-processors or software-based emulation capabilities. Consequently, these NNs, in practice, are quantized using low-precision fixed-point arithmetic [6], [7] to optimize area or latency. It is thus

crucial to verify that after quantization, the implementations still satisfy the error bounds derived during safety verification. Unfortunately, current safety verification methods do not consider final implementations and thus do not guarantee that the implementations meet the derived error bounds.

Various automated quantization approaches exist for NNs. Some adopt uniform precision for all layers [6], [7], [8], while others focus on mixed-precision quantization [9], [10], [11], [12], which has gained more popularity for using different precisions for different operations or layers, leading to greater resource savings. While most quantization methods dynamically compare classification accuracy without guaranteeing for all possible inputs, only the tool Aster [12] generates sound NN controller implementations that meet predefined error bounds. However, Aster assumes the safety of the NN controllers has been proven within the error bounds.

In this paper, we introduce *Nexus*, a two-phase framework that integrates safety verification with mixed fixed-point quantization of NN controllers. We employ a state-of-the-art scalable reachability analyzer POLAR-Express [2] to prove the safety of the closed-loop NN-controlled system in a finite time and adapt it to consider an error for implementations. If the system is proven safe, we then utilize the only existing sound NN quantizer Aster to generate a mixed fixed-point implementation guaranteeing the error bound. This implementation can then be compiled using commercial HLS compilers. Furthermore, *Nexus* extends Aster’s code generation to produce code with loops, automatically parallelizable by HLS compilers, thus reducing the latency of the final code. Our evaluation shows that the latencies of *Nexus*’s code are significantly less than Aster’s for all 7 safe benchmarks that we consider for our experiments. These reductions are particularly high for 3 other larger benchmarks with thousands of parameters.

Though there is a large body of work on integrating different analyses, our approach is unique, as, to the best of our knowledge, *Nexus* is the first tool to offer an end-to-end solution for precision-aware, safe, NN-controlled CPSs. Our novel extensions also generate parallel code constructs, effectively leveraging hardware. In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:

- 1) an end-to-end method with a prototype tool that combines closed-loop safety verification of CPS and sound quantization of NN controllers available at <https://github.com/harikishants/Nexus>,
- 2) an extended code generation compatible with commercial HLS compilers for automated parallelization, and
- 3) an evaluation on benchmarks collected from both academic and industrial settings.

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


Fig. 1: An Overview of Nexus

II. NEXUS: A TWO-PHASE FRAMEWORK

Consider an inverted pendulum taken from [1]. The plant state is represented by a 4-parameter vector \bar{x} (horizontal position and velocity of the cart, angular position and velocity of the pendulum) with initial conditions $x_1 \in [0.1, 0.11]$, $x_2 = x_3 = x_4 = 0$ and a control input $u = 0$. The plant dynamics are given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x}_1 &= x_2, \quad \dot{x}_2 = 0.0043x_4 - 2.75x_3 + 1.94u - 10.95x_2, \\ \dot{x}_3 &= x_4, \quad \dot{x}_4 = 28.58x_3 - 0.044x_4 + 4.44u + 24.92x_2.\end{aligned}$$

The safety property requires keeping the pendulum vertically balanced by maintaining $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 \in [-0.2, 0.2]$ for 1s with a control step size of 0.05 s. The NN controller takes \bar{x} as input and outputs the control action u . An error bound of $1e-5$ is considered to account for implementation errors. Our goal is to prove that the system is safe and, if so, generate a controller implementation that satisfies the error bound.

Fig. 1 provides an overview of Nexus. It begins with the plant dynamics, initial conditions, safety property, and error bound and verifies system safety using reachability analysis with POLAR-Express [2] under real arithmetic. If the system is safe, Nexus extracts the max and min values to define the sound ranges of the plant states. Next, these ranges and the error bound are used to quantize the NN controller into a fixed-point mixed-precision C++ implementation, guaranteeing the error bound, with Aster [12]. This approach ensures that Nexus not only proves system safety but also generates implementations that maintain system safety and the error bound. The following sections explain each of these phases in detail.

A. First Phase: Safety Verification

In this phase, we prove safety by simulating exact or over-approximated reachable sets containing all possible trajectories of the plant. We then verify if any unsafe state can be reached from a given initial state. The underlying reachability analysis tool POLAR-Express iteratively computes functional over-approximations of reachable states using a layer-by-layer propagation of Taylor model $TM(p, I)$, where p is the polynomial used for approximation and I denotes the interval remainder, capturing the over-approximation error (we refer the readers to [2] for more details). While adjusting I ensures tight over-approximations, it does not account for implementation errors that may arise when quantizing NN controllers for resource-constrained embedded platforms using fixed-point arithmetic.

To address this, in Nexus, we add a predefined quantization error (ϵ) during safety verification. In each step of the reachability analysis, the error ϵ is added to the remainder I

```

1 def code_gen(in  $\bar{x}$ , weight  $\mathbf{W}$ , bias  $\mathbf{b}$ , act  $\alpha$ , lyr L):
2   in  $\leftarrow \bar{x}$ 
3   for  $l \leftarrow 2$  to L: tmp, sum, out  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ 
4     for  $i \leftarrow$  neurons in layer  $l$ : // parallelized
5       for  $j \leftarrow$  neurons in layer  $l-1$ : // parallelized
6         tmp $_j \leftarrow w_{ij}^l \cdot in_j$ 
7         sum $_i \leftarrow b_i^l$ 
8         for  $j \leftarrow$  neurons in layer  $l-1$ :
9           sum $_i \leftarrow sum_i + tmp_j$ 
10        out $_i \leftarrow \alpha_l(sum_i)$ 
11   in  $\leftarrow$  out

```

Fig. 2: Nexus’s Code Generation

of the NN output. Thus, safety analysis is performed considering errors from both over-approximations of the reachability analysis and code quantization.

If Nexus proves that the system is safe, it extracts ranges (\mathbf{R}_i) for all plant state variables from the i^{th} simulation step by adding I to the over-approximated ranges ensuring soundness. From the set of all \mathbf{R}_i for all plant state variables, Nexus computes the max and min values to generate sound ranges for these variables, which are the inputs to the NN controller.

For the inverted pendulum, Nexus proves that the system is safe for 20 simulation steps, considering the initial conditions and safety property, and generates the following ranges for the plant state variables: $x_1 \in [0.07, 0.11]$, $x_2 \in [-0.05, 0.05]$, $x_3 \in [-0.01, 0.00]$, and $x_4 \in [-0.12, 0.02]$.

B. Second Phase: Sound NN Quantization

In the next phase of Nexus, the goal is to quantize the safe real-valued NN controllers to generate a mixed-precision fixed-point (represented by the total number of bits and the binary point position deciding the number of fractional bits) code that can be run efficiently in embedded systems.

Nexus utilizes the ranges of NN input variables from the first phase and the error bound to generate an implementation by solving an optimization problem. This problem aims to minimize the required number of bits for all variables and constants while adhering to the error bound and avoiding overflow in fixed-point quantization. Internally, Nexus employs Aster to define and solve this optimization problem (for detailed constraints, see [12]). If it is impossible to generate an implementation within the maximum allowed number of bits (e.g., 32 bits), Nexus returns an infeasible solution. Otherwise, it generates a complete C++ implementation directly compatible with commercial HLS compilers such as Xilinx Vitis HLS [13]. Consequently, an FPGA design can be synthesized, and the simulated running time (or latency) can be obtained in terms of clock cycles. It is important to note that as Aster can only handle feed-forward DNNs with ‘linear’ and ‘relu’ activations, Nexus also operates under the same constraints.

For the inverted pendulum, we use the ranges generated in the first phase and configure Nexus to use a range [10, 32] of fractional bits for all variables and an initial error of 2^{-32} . Nexus successfully generates an implementation for it.

Extended Code Generation: The underlying tool Aster generates implementations with both fully *unrolled* code (where matrices and vectors are converted into scalar variables) and a *looped* version that keeps the data structures

benchmarks	#plant-vars	neural controller spec.		
		ctrl-step	#hid-lyr	#params
InvPend	6	0.05	1	60
MountCar	3	1.00	2	336
SglPend	4	0.05	2	775
DblPendV1	7	0.05	2	825
DblPendV2	7	0.02	2	825
ACC3	10	0.10	3	980
ACC5	10	0.10	5	1,820
ACC7	10	0.10	7	2,660
Unicycle	7	0.20	1	3,500
ACC10	10	0.10	10	3,920
Airplane	19	0.10	3	13,540
TORA	5	1.00	3	20,800

TABLE I: Benchmark details (plant controller specifications)

intact. However, it does not leverage the inherent parallelism available in custom hardware like FPGAs. Nexus extends the vanilla code generation by adding directives and nested looped constructs to enable automated parallelism in standard HLS compilers, synthesizing a parallelized hardware design that reduces latency. We present the extended code generation in Fig. 2. In an NN, each layer depends on the previous layer, requiring serial computation across layers. However, within each layer, the computation of each neuron’s output is independent and can be parallelized (line 4). Additionally, the multiplications of weights and inputs within each neuron are independent and can be parallelized (line 5). Thus, Nexus returns a C++ code with nested loops and directives.

We utilized Nexus’s code generation for the inverted pendulum example. Nexus’s nested looped code achieved a latency of 14 cycles, outperforming vanilla Aster’s unrolled code with 16 cycles and looped code with 18 cycles.

III. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

a) Benchmarks: We used 12 NN controllers from Aster’s benchmark set [12] and collected the respective plant dynamics from the competition at the ARCH workshop from the years 2019 [14] and 2020 [1]. These include controllers for inverted pendulums (InvPend, SglPend, DblPend nonrobust V1 and robust V2), cars (Unicycle, MountCar), a rotational actuator (TORA), a simple aircraft (Airplane), and adaptive cruise controllers with different hidden layers (ACCs). The details of the benchmarks are presented in Table I.

b) Experimental Setup: All experiments were done on an Ubuntu 20.04 running on an Intel Core i5 system with 3.3 GHz clock speed and 32 GB RAM. We used POLAR-Express (commit 13d42b0) and Aster (commit 2c991fb), downloaded from GitHub on Aug. 18, 2023, and Mar. 20, 2024, respectively. For FPGA design synthesis, we employed Xilinx’s Vitis HLS [13] (version 2023.2), downloaded on Feb. 22, 2024.

We configured Aster with two settings and two error bounds: A for error $1e-3$ and B for $1e-5$. Setting A initialized the number of fractional bits to 20 (error: 2^{-20}), and setting B to 32 (error: 2^{-32}). Both settings allowed a max of 32 bits, with ranges of fractional bits [5, 32] for setting A and [10, 32] for setting B. A run of Nexus was allocated a 5-hour time budget.

c) Safety Verification and Sound Code Generation: Table II summarizes all experiments. As expected, more benchmarks (8 out of 12) are safe with the smaller error bound

benchmarks	error: $1e-3$, setting A			error: $1e-5$, setting B		
	safe	latency	time(s)	safe	latency	time(s)
InvPend	✓	12	3.15	✓	14	3.16
MountCar	✗	-	-	✓	25	66.35
SglPend	✓	23	5.16	✓	27	5.15
DblPendV1	✓	26	7.10	✓	27	6.80
DblPendV2	✓	26	5.80	✓	28	5.84
ACC3	✓	40	10.49	✓	39	10.47
ACC5	✓	inf	-	✓	63	19.78
ACC7	✓	inf	-	✓	inf	-
Unicycle	✗	-	-	✗	-	-
ACC10	✗	-	-	✗	-	-
Airplane	✗	-	-	✗	-	-
TORA	✗	-	-	✗	-	-

TABLE II: Safety analysis (✓: safe, ✗: unsafe, ✕: analysis fails), latencies of safe controller implementations (inf: tool returns infeasible) and running times of Nexus

of $1e-5$ compared to $1e-3$ (7 out of 12). For larger benchmarks like Unicycle, ACC10, high over-approximations in reachability analysis prevented safety verification. The largest benchmarks, Airplane and TORA, were found unsafe given our initial conditions, safety properties, and error bounds.

For benchmarks proven safe in the first phase, we attempted to generate implementations with Nexus’s code generation. Setting A, starting with a larger initial error (2^{-20}), is expected to report more infeasibility where generating a sound implementation that satisfies both the error bound and the max bit length is impossible. This was observed for ACC5. For ACC7, Nexus returns infeasible for both errors due to increasing over-approximation errors with the increasing number of layers.

For benchmarks where we could generate implementations, we compiled them for a standard FPGA architecture using Xilinx’s HLS and presented the latencies in clock cycles that the compiler reported for the final hardware implementations. Naturally, the implementations with the error bound $1e-5$ have higher latencies due to the increased no. of bits required to satisfy this smaller error bound compared to the error $1e-3$.

We also show the running times in Table II (columns 4, 7). While time increases with the size of the networks, Nexus took a max of 20s for the largest safe benchmark, ACC5.

d) Looped Code Generation: This section compares Aster’s code generation with Nexus’s, as shown in Table III. We refer to the code without parallelization directives as *serial* and the code with directives as *parallel*. We generated parallel versions of Aster’s unrolled and looped code and the serial version of Nexus’s nested-loop code. The benchmarks presented here are those for which we could generate implementations.

Our results show that using directives in unrolled code does not improve latencies w.r.t. the serial version due to instruction inter-dependencies (except for InvPend and DblPend). However, the compiler effectively identified parallelism in the looped and nested-looped versions, significantly reducing latency compared to the serial versions. Moreover, as expected, unrolled serial implementations have lower latencies, but Nexus’s nested-looped parallel implementations outperform them due to efficient parallelization, especially for larger NNs.

We also compared the design synthesis times. Our results show that while serial implementations have shorter synthesis times, the looped versions are faster than the unrolled ones

benchmarks	latencies of implementations (cycles)						design synthesis time (s)					
	unrolled		looped		nested-looped		unrolled		looped		nested-looped	
	serial	parallel	serial	parallel	serial	parallel	serial	parallel	serial	parallel	serial	parallel
InvPend	16	15	36	18	57	14	27.75	26.84	24.85	25.93	23.41	24.37
MountCar	30	30	92	38	106	25	43.37	43.41	28.33	34.81	24.43	31.32
Sg1Pend	31	30	122	47	141	27	72.37	72.89	35.30	51.08	24.72	46.16
Db1PendV1	32	31	135	50	89	27	77.90	77.34	35.30	51.22	25.46	44.34
Db1PendV2	35	34	134	51	90	28	78.97	76.10	36.65	52.63	25.49	43.21
ACC3	58	58	162	65	158	39	94.06	94.64	38.54	59.29	26.26	49.91
ACC5	99	99	273	107	229	63	199.12	191.53	50.34	99.26	33.62	98.23

TABLE III: Comparing Aster’s unrolled serial and looped serial implementations with Nexus’s optimized implementations (nested-looped serial and all parallels) for automated parallelization using Xilinx with error $1e - 5$ and setting B

benchmarks	Aster (serial)		Nexus (parallel)	
	unrolled	looped	looped	nested-looped
Unicycle	29	864	265	18
Airplane	75	510	152	43
TORA	×	604	186	41

TABLE IV: Comparing latencies of Aster’s and Nexus’s implementations for larger benchmarks (×: Xilinx fails)

due to the more compact representation of NNs.

To demonstrate the utility of Nexus’s code generation for larger NNs, we used the second phase of Nexus to generate code for the three largest unsafe benchmarks with error $1e - 3$ and setting B (setting A was `inf` due to the large initial error). Generating looped code is crucial for these benchmarks as serial implementations can become too large to compile (e.g., 62K lines of code for TORA). Table IV presents the results. It shows that Nexus’s parallel nested-looped code significantly outperforms Aster in terms of latency for all three benchmarks.

IV. RELATED WORK

The safety verification of NN-controlled CPSs has attracted significant attention in recent years. Methods like [2] utilize Taylor approximation of the NN controller and construct a flowpipe to compute tight over-approximated reachable sets, while others [4] convert the controller into an equivalent non-linear hybrid system, then combine with the plant dynamics to verify safety properties. Similarly, NN verification is done by combining it with standard hybrid automata verification [15], approximating it with a polynomial with error bounds [3], or using set representations such as star sets [5] with tight over-approximations of error bounds. In principle, any of these methods could be used for the first phase of Nexus. However, these techniques assume real-valued arithmetic for their safety proofs and do not verify safety after quantization.

Alternatively, there is extensive literature on the quantization of neural networks [6], [7], [8], [12], [9], [10], [11], but most techniques have been dynamically applied to neural network classifiers outside of safety-critical applications. Hence, they are fundamentally different from the sound mixed-precision tuning for controllers, which is the goal of this paper.

The only work similar in flavour to ours is presented in [16], where the focus is also on verifying a floating-point implementation w.r.t a high-level linear time-invariant model of the controller. However, they do not consider NN controllers or fixed mixed-precision implementations. Also, they extract a high-level model from the implementation and verify it,

whereas we automatically generate the implementation that satisfies the properties of the high-level model.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper presents a novel, scalable integration of reachability analysis with sound quantization for NN-controlled CPSs. Our generated implementations show optimization potential in terms of latency, especially for custom hardware like FPGAs. While we currently focus on feed-forward NN controllers with ReLU and linear activations due to underlying tool constraints, the future holds promise for further enhancements to Nexus, including support for non-linear activations, hybrid controllers, and other networks like CNN.

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